The distinction between A) people who marginally resent the share of their taxes that goes to supporting those with various physical or mental health challenges, or toward assistance for individuals (or their caregivers) with disabilities resulting from either inherited or other developmental disorders, should be clearly discerned from B) totalitarian Nazi argumentation. It has been relevant in some representations targeted at the Canadian political environment of some recent years that these are not at all the same thing.
Typology A: Moderate annoyance at the 30 seconds or so per work day that goes to helping these people, via taxation.
Typology B: Willingness to engage in any and all levels of political suppression in order to eradicate all those who are supportive of everyone (including by use of other people’s money through the tax system) having to contribute to helping those with various perceived or actual disabilities.
(It should be noted that many other people — a strong majority in many advanced countries who could then be categorized in some Typology C — identify with neither of these, under the belief that in a decent society, society helps out the less fortunate.)
The first of these is potentially consistent with being callous, or in other cases being truly caring but willing to set aside emotional reasoning or ethical reasoning in order to question whether something adds up as ethical policy.
The second of these would (under the assumption that their individual superiority and/or sufficient subservience would result in them being well-placed) place a Hitler, a Stalin or others on a pedestal to evade this 30-second or so daily cost related to helping, instead of doing away with, people who for whatever reason have basically no prospects of ever having a stage of life where they produce exchangeable goods and services valued in the present market economy.
In other words, the ability to entertain cold calculation as a point of reference is not the same thing as genocidal psychopathy. This is important, because in some recent years some people in the first group appear to have been manipulated into believing that they belong to the second group under the belief that the status quo will lead to the Russians or Chinese or perhaps Martians to utterly defeat those with white skin and/or those who obtain high scores on standardized tests. However, when push comes to shove, it seems that the main complaint is to the effect of “uh … that costs money, right? And, nothing really against those people, but I’m not all that sure I really want to pay.”
Other distinctions between reasonable people and Nazi ideology:
A) The belief that some particular individuals should not reproduce, perhaps because they will make bad parents, or because they will spread bad genes.
For example, if you know you carry a genetic disease that will with 50% probability cause an extremely painful and costly life for offspring, consider adopting. Or, if you get extremely drunk 6 nights a week after your job at a bar, and frequently use a variety of designer drugs for recreational reasons, consider refraining from parenthood (e.g., use an effective means of contraception) until such habits are more under control. (Some people would call this common sense.)
B) The belief that the government should mandatorily sterilize (or otherwise drive out of the reproductive pool) all men and women who do not perform well at the specified time and specified place on a specified test that is standardized in nature.
A) and B) are not the same things. They are substantively different.
However, there seem to exist some individuals in both of the B) categories who appear unable to fathom the possibility that someone could identify with both of the A) categorizations, and not proceed (e.g., via 1%=100% logic) to a preference for variants of genocide and/or direct government control over reproduction. Such situations would tend to pose a particular kind of communications challenge, which has important differences compared to communicating with those who in fact belong in typology A, and were for some period of time fooled into believing that, therefore, they necessarily belong to typology B.